Failure detectors have long been viewed as abstractions for the synchronism present in distributed system models. However, investigations into the exact amount of synchronism encapsulated by a given failure detector have met with limited success. The reason for this is that traditionally, models of partial synchrony are specified with respect to real time, but failure detectors do not encapsulate real time. Instead, we argue that failure detectors encapsulate the fairness in computation and communication. Fairness is a measure of the number of steps executed by one process relative either to the number of steps taken by another process or relative to the duration for which a message is in transit. We argue that partially synchronous systems are perhaps better specified with fairness constraints (rather than real-time constraints) on computation and communication. We demonstrate the utility of this approach by specifying the weakest system models to implement failure detectors in the Chandra-Toueg hierarchy.
Introduction
The inability to distinguish a crashed process from a slow process makes it impossible to solve several classic problems in distributed computing in crash-prone asynchronous systems [19] . Efforts to circumvent this impossibility have spawned two complementary approaches. The first approach, called partial synchrony [17, 16] , focuses on assuming explicit temporal guarantees on computation and communication to enable crash detection. The second approach focuses on augmenting the asynchronous system with an oracle, called a failure detector [9] , that provides (potentially incorrect) information about process crashes in the system.
It has long been held that failure detectors encapsulate partial synchrony; that is, given a partially synchronous system model M , it is possible to replace M with an asynchronous system augmented with an appropriate failure detector D (that is implementable in M ) such that all the problems solvable in M are also solvable in the asynchronous system augmented with D. This belief has led to the pursuit of the 'weakest partially synchronous model' to implement popular failure detectors. Our work contributes to this pursuit in two ways: (a) it argues that such 'weakest system models' are not specified by computational and communicational bounds in real-time units; instead, such models are specified by restrictions on 'fairness': a measure of the number of steps executed by a process relative to other events in the system, and (b) it proposes four fairnessbased partially synchronous models and demonstrates that they are, in fact, the 'weakest system models' to implement the failure detectors proposed by Chandra and Toueg in [9] . Partial Synchrony and Failure Detectors. A system model is considered to be partially synchronous [17, 16] if it provides some temporal guarantees on computation and communication. Upper bounds on relative process speeds and message delay are examples of such guarantees. In partially synchronous systems, the knowledge of such guarantees may be incomplete or unknown. Partial synchrony is useful for solving problems in crash-prone distributed systems and several such models have been proposed in the literature (e.g., [17, 16, 31, 2, 4, 18, 13, 22, 30] ). These models vary in the guarantees they provide on computation and communication, and consequently, they have different crash detection capabilities. One way of formalizing this notion of crash detection capability is with failure detectors.
Informally, failure detectors [9] may be viewed as a system service that can be queried for (potentially unreliable) information about process crashes in the system. The unreliability in the output may be either because processes that are not crashed have been wrongfully suspected or crashed processes have not been suspected. Despite such unreliability, it is known that several problems in distributed computing that are unsolvable in a crash-prone asynchronous system become solvable when the system is augmented with specific failure detectors.
In other words, several problems in distributed computing can be solved in crash-prone systems by assuming either that the system is partially synchronous or that the system is asynchronous, but augmented with an appropriate failure detector. This observation leads one to postulate that the axiomatic properties of a failure detector codify the temporal guarantees provided by an 'equivalent' partially synchronous system. Hence, the pursuit of 'weakest' system models that implement various failure detectors.
Current work on the weakest system models for failure detectors (see Section 2) has met with limited success partly because the proposed system models assume real-time based bounds on communication (and possibly computation too). Unfortunately, failure detectors do not encapsulate real time: this was illustrated in [11] and explained in [12] . So in order to find such weakest system models, we need to answer the question: what precisely about partial synchrony do these failure detectors encapsulate?
We argue that failure detectors (at least when restricted to the failure detectors proposed in [9] ) encapsulate 'fairness' in executions that arise from the temporal guarantees on computation and communication. Such fairness is of two types: computational fairness and communicational fairness. Computational fairness specifies the number of steps executed by processes relative to each other; communicational fairness specifies the number of steps executes by the recipient of a message while that message is in transit.
Computational Fairness. A common specification for computational fairness is bounded relative process speeds [17] which states that the system has a bound Φ on relative process speeds if in all intervals where some process i takes Φ + 1 steps, then all the processes not crashed in that interval are guaranteed to take at least 1 step. Note that this fairness property is symmetric, that is, if i's process speed is bounded relative to j's process speed, then vice versa is true as well. However, it is possible to define a computational fairness property that is asymmetric. For instance, process i may be Φ-fair with respect to j if in all intervals where i takes Φ + 1 steps, j is guaranteed to take at least 1 step. But note that this does not require j to be Φ-fair with respect to i.
Communicational Fairness. Typically, guarantees on communication in partial synchrony are specified as real-time deadlines on message delay. Unlike computational fairness, specifying these guarantees in terms of communicational fairness is not straightforward. For a process i to satisfy communicational fairness, it is necessary that i does not take 'too many steps' while a message m is en route to i; that is, there exists a non-negative integer d such that in the interval that starts when message m is sent (to i) and ends when m is received by i, process i takes no more than d steps. However, there is one exception: if the sender of m crashes while m is in transit to i, then i can take an arbitrary number of steps before m is delivered. In fact, m may even be dropped. Organization. We present related work in Section 2. Section 3 provides formal specifications for the asynchronous system model, failure detectors, and the fairness-based partially synchronous systems AF, SF, 3AF, and 3SF which we claim are the weakest to implement P, S, 3P, and 3S, respectively. In Section 4 we outline the methodology used to prove the aforementioned claim. Then, in Section 5 we demonstrate the necessity of the fairness constraints specified in AF, SF, 3AF, and 3SF to implement P, S, 3P, and 3S, respectively. In Section 6 we demonstrate the sufficiency of AF, SF, 3AF, and 3SF to implement P, S, 3P, and 3S, respectively. Finally, discussion is in Section 7.
Related Work
The Chandra-Toueg Hierarchy. Chandra and Toueg introduced eight failure detectors in [9] , the Chandra-Toueg hierarchy. It was also shown in [9] that the Chandra-Toueg hierarchy can be collapsed to the following four failure detectors: (1) the perfect failure detector P, which never suspects any process before the latter crashes and always suspects crashed processes, (2) the eventually perfect failure detector 3P, which stops suspecting all processes that never crash and always suspects all crashed processes, but only after some (potentially unknown) time, (3) the strong failure detector S, which never suspects some process that never crashes (and is permitted to suspect all other processes) and always suspects crashed processes, and (4) the eventually strong failure detector 3S, which never suspects some process that will never crash (and is permitted to suspect all other processes) and always suspects crashed processes, but only after some (potentially unknown) time.
Chasing the Weakest Model. Among the four Chandra-Toueg failure detectors, a significant amount of research focuses on 3S and 3P
1 . Many 3S and 3P implementations focus on weakening the synchrony and/or reliability assumptions of existing models of partial synchrony to get to the 'weakest' system model that can implement these failure detectors. Consider 3S: it was first shown in [24] that a system with unknown and eventual bounds on relative process speeds and message delay was sufficient to implement 3S. Through subsequent results [4, 26, 2, 23] , the weakest-to-date system model to implement 3S in the presence of at most f process crashes guarantees that eventually (a) computation is synchronous and (b) some correct process has f timely outgoing links and the set of f timely links can vary throughout the execution.
Similarly, consider 3P implementations: It was shown in [9] that a system with unknown and eventual bounds on relative process speeds and message delay was sufficient to implement 3P. Subsequently it was shown that it is sufficient if there is some upper bound on the average delay of messages [18] with potentially infinite message loss [31] and process speeds vary arbitrarily but relative process speeds are bounded [32] .
Note that all the above proposed system models, while claiming to be weakest to-date to implement their respective failure detectors, do not claim to be the weakest to do so. The closest result to the 'weakest' message-passing system model to implement 3S, 3P, and other eventually accurate failure detectors is [5] which demonstrates that with respect to solvability 3S, 3P, and other failure detectors are 'equivalent' to various partially synchronous models. The authors of [5] are aware that their transformations do not preserve bounds on real-time message delay. They claim that the bounds message delay is preserved in a 'relativistic' sense, but they do not expound on the interpretation of the term 'relativistic'. Our work formalizes the 'relativistic' message delay as a form of communicational fairness. Weakest Models for Failure Detectors in Shared Memory. The notion of 'capturing the power' of a failure detector was explored in [29] for shared-memory systems. The results in [29] show that the 'power' of limited scope accuracy 2 [33] failure detectors in systems with single-writer/multi-reader atomic registers can be expressed as restrictions on the number of read-/write operations by each process in every round (in other words, fairness in the number of read/write operations per process per round). Our work, which focuses on message-passing systems, deviates from [29] in three significant ways. First, the weakest failure detectors for solving problems in message-passing systems may be different from shared-memory systems. For example, consider wait-free consensus. The weakest failure detector to solve wait-free consensus in asynchronous sharedmemory systems is Ω [25] 3 whereas the weakest failure detector to solve the same problem in message-passing systems is (Ω, Σ) [14] . 4 . Similarly, for solving wait-free k-set agreement, the weakest failure detector in shared-memory systems is anti-Ω k [20] 5 , but the weakest failure detector in message-passing systems remains an open problem [6, 7] .Therefore, 'capturing the power' of a failure detector in message-passing system merits a separate investigation.
Second, assuming read/write atomicity is equivalent to assuming an asynchronous message-passing system augmented with the quorum failure detector Σ [14] . In other words, asynchronous systems under message passing are 'less synchronous' than asynchronous systems under shared-memory. Consequently, the results from [29] need not (and do not) carry over to message-passing systems.
Third, the results in [29] demonstrate fairness constraints only for classes of eventually accurate oracles; in contrast, our results address the synchronism captured by fairness constraints for both eventually accurate oracles and perpetually accurate oracles. To our knowledge, our work is the first to establish such equivalence between partial synchrony and failure detectors with perpetual accuracy. As a consequence of our results, we answer a question implicitly posed in [11] : Given that synchronous systems are 'more synchronous' than the perfect failure detector P, what is the 'gap in synchronism' between P and synchronous systems? We answer this question in Section 7. Fairness-Based Partial Synchrony. Several fairness-based partially synchronous models have been proposed in the past to implement failure detectors. Two classic examples are the Θ-model [22] and the asynchronous bounded cycle (ABC) model [30] . The Θ-model bounds the ratio of the end-to-end communication delay of messages that are simultaneously in transit, while the ABC model imposes a restriction on the ratio of the number of messages that can be exchanged between 1 The popularity of 3S and 3P is not just incidental. Despite apparently weak guarantees on crash fault detection, 3S has been shown to solve consensus and other related problems [9, 8] , and 3P has been shown to solve problems including dining philosophers [27, 28] , stable leader election [3] , quiescent reliable communication [1] , and contention management [21] . 2 Limited scope accuracy is a weaker generalization of weak accuracy wherein a correct process need not be trusted by all other processes but only by a subset of the processes that are ostensibly 'near' the correct process. Limited scope accuracy captures the idea that a process may detect failures reliably on the same local-area network, but less reliably over a wide-area network. 3 The leader failure detector Ω outputs the id of a process at each process. There is a time after which it outputs the id of the same correct process at all correct processes. 4 The quorum failure detector Σ outputs a set of processes at each process. Any two sets (output at any times and by any processes) intersect, and eventually every set output at correct processes consists only of correct processes 5 The failure detector anti-Ω k outputs, at each process and each time, a set of n − k processes. Anti-Ω k guarantees that there is a time after which some correct is never output. pairs of processes in certain "relevant" segments of an asynchronous execution. While both these system models combine computational and communicational fairness into a single system parameter, both are strong enough to implement 3S and 3P 6 .
Definitions

Asynchronous System Model
• Processes. The system has a finite set of processes Π.
• Global time. We posit the existence of a discrete global time base whose range of values is the natural numbers IN.
Informally, global time is used to mark or count the events that occur in the system, and it is not used to measure the real-time duration between two events. Therefore, the real-time duration between consecutive ticks of the global time may be arbitrary, but finite. In the remainder of this paper, 'time' will refer to global time unless explicitly stated otherwise.
• Faults and fault patterns. A process can fail only by crashing, which happens when the process ceases execution without warning and never recovers. The processes that crash are said to be faulty and the processes that do not crash are said to be correct (or non-faulty). A fault pattern is a function F that returns the set of crashed processes at any given time. That is, F : IN → 2 Π ; F (t) denotes the set of processes that are crashed at time t. Since crashed processes never recover, ∀t, t ∈ IN, t < t : F (t) ⊆ F (t ). We define f aulty(F ) = ∪ ∀t∈IN F (t) and correct(F ) = Π − f aulty(F ); that is, f aulty(F ) denotes all the processes that crash in F and correct(F ) denotes all the processes that are correct in F . A process that has not crashed at time t is said to be live. We consider only fault patterns F in which at least one process is correct; that is, correct(F ) = ∅; let the set of all such fault patterns be denoted F.
• Failure detectors. A failure detector [9] is a distributed oracle that can be queried for (potentially incorrect) information about crash faults in a set of processes Π. Each process in Π is assumed to have access to a local failure detector module which outputs a subset of Π currently suspected as having crashed.
Informally, a failure detector history describes the output of a failure detector during an execution. Formally, a failure detector history H is function that maps Π × IN to 2 Π ; H(p, t) is the set of processes output by a failure detector to process p at time t. A failure detector D may be viewed as a function D : F → 2 H − ∅; that is, D maps every fault pattern F to a non-empty set of failure detector histories. In other words, D(F ) denotes the set of all possible histories that may be output by D when the fault pattern is F .
Note that it is not necessary for algorithms to have access to, or even use, failure detectors. In such cases, we assume that the algorithms query a NULL failure detector which will always output ∅ upon being queried.
• Steps. Each process is modeled as a (possibly infinite) state machine. Each transition of the state machine -or step of the process -takes as input the current state of the process, a set consisting of zero or more messages from each other process (the "received" messages), and the output from the failure detector; it produces as output a new state for the process and a set of messages consisting of at most one message to each other process (the "sent" messages). Certain states are identified as initial states.
• Configuration. A configuration of the system consists of a state for each process and the set of all messages that have been sent but not yet received, called the in-transit messages (we assume each message can be uniquely identified).
• Runs. A run is defined with respect to a set of processes (i.e., an algorithm), a fault pattern F , and a history H of a failure detector D. A run of the system is an infinite sequence of alternating configurations and steps, of the form α = C 0 , s 1 , C 1 , s 2 , . . .. The sequence must satisfy the following properties:
-C 0 is an initial configuration (every process is in an initial state and no messages are in transit).
-For each i ≥ 1, a unique time t i ∈ IN is associated with s i such that if i < j, then t i < t j . 6 In fact, they can implement eventual round-based executions which is sufficient to implement 3P and 3S.
-For each i ≥ 1, s i must be applicable to C i−1 , meaning: * All the messages to be received during s i are in transit in C i−1 . * The failure detector output that is used as input to the transition indicated by s i is H(p i , t i ), where p i is the process taking a step at s i and t i is the time associated with s i . * The process executing s i (say, p i ) is live at time t i ; that is, p i / ∈ F (t i ).
-For each i ≥ 1, C i is the result of applying step s i to C i−1 : the state of the process executing s i changes according to the transition function of the process, no other processes change state, the messages received during s i are removed from the set of in-transit messages, and the messages sent during s i are added to the set of in-transit messages.
-Every correct process takes an infinite number of steps. To model algorithms that terminate, a correct process can enter a final state S f in a run so that subsequently the process takes only dummy steps that send and receive no messages and keep the process in S f .
-Every message that is sent from (say) process i to (say) process j is guaranteed to be delivered iff both i and j are non-faulty. This assumption implies the following: (a) process crashes can never partition the system, and (b) all the messages sent by i that are in-transit when i crashes may be dropped. If process i crashes at time t while a set of messages M , sent by i, are in transit at time t, then messages in M may or may not be delivered.
-For all non-empty intervals of time, every process in Π executes only a finite number of steps. This property is ensures that "Zeno behavior" is prohibited in a valid run; that is, processes are not permitted to accelerate such that they execute an infinite number of steps in finite time.
Failure Detectors
As mentioned previously, failure detectors can be characterized by the restrictions on their histories for various fault patterns. Failure detectors are classified into various classes based on certain restrictions on their histories. These restrictions are specified by two abstract properties: completeness and accuracy. The original definition of failure detectors [9] considers two completeness properties Weak Completeness and Strong Completeness. However, [9] shows that under all-to-all communication, weak completeness can be transformed to strong completeness while preserving accuracy. Therefore, in our discussion here, we consider only strong completeness, which states that eventually every faulty process is permanently suspected by every correct process; that is, a failure detector D satisfies strong completeness iff ∀F ∈ F, ∀H ∈ D(F ), ∀i ∈ f aulty(F ), ∀j ∈ correct(F ), ∃t ∈ IN : ∀t > t : i ∈ H(j, t ).
There are four accuracy properties specified for the canonical failure detector classes in [9] : Strong Accuracy, Weak Accuracy, Eventually Strong Accuracy, and Eventually Weak Accuracy.
• Strong Accuracy states that no process is suspected before it crashes; that is, ∀F ∈ F, ∀H ∈ D(F ), ∀t ∈ IN, ∀i, j ∈ Π − F (t) :: i / ∈ H(j, t).
• Weak Accuracy states that some correct process is never suspected; that is,
• Eventual Strong Accuracy states that correct processes are eventually never suspected by any correct process; that is,
• Eventual Weak Accuracy states that some correct process eventually is never suspected by any correct process; that is, ∀F ∈ F, ∀H ∈ D(F ), ∃i ∈ correct(F ), ∀j ∈ correct(F ), ∃t ∈ IN : ∀t > t : i / ∈ H(j, t ).
Note that the word 'eventually' in the above properties refers to the existence of a potentially unknown time after which the properties hold. The completeness and accuracy properties stated above define four failure detector classes ( [9] ):
• Perfect failure detector (denoted P) satisfies strong completeness and strong accuracy.
• Strong failure detector (denoted S) satisfies strong completeness and weak accuracy.
• Eventually Perfect failure detector (denoted 3P) satisfies strong completeness and eventual strong accuracy.
• Eventually Strong failure detector (denoted 3S) satisfies strong completeness and eventual weak accuracy.
Alternate Definitions of Failure Detector Classes. In order to facilitate an understanding of how these failure detectors encapsulate fairness, we propose alternate (but equivalent) definitions of these failure detector classes. These alternate definitions are based on the definition of a distinguished process. Informally, a process i is said to be distinguished if i is never suspected until it crashes, and after crashing, i is suspected by all live processes and remains suspected forever thereafter. Similarly, a process i is said to be eventually distinguished if there is a time t (which may or may not be known) after which i is distinguished. In other words, an eventually distinguished process may be falsely suspected before (some potentially unknown) time t. Note that every distinguished process is also an eventually distinguished process where the time t is 0. Formally, a process i is said to be distinguished with respect to a failure detector D if, ∀F ∈ F, ∀H ∈ D(F ), the following properties are satisfied:
•
Similarly, a process i is said to be eventually distinguished with respect to a failure detector D if, ∀F ∈ F, ∀H ∈ D(F ), the following properties are satisfied:
Based on this definition of a distinguished process (and the auxiliary definition of an eventually distinguished process), we redefine the four failure detectors classes as follows:
• P is a failure detector for which every process is distinguished.
• S is a failure detector for which some correct process is distinguished, and all faulty processes are eventually distinguished.
• 3P is a failure detector for which every process is eventually distinguished.
• 3S is a failure detector for which some correct process is eventually distinguished, and all faulty processes are eventually distinguished.
Note that in all the four failure detector classes, faulty processes are eventually distinguished. This property is called strong completeness [9] which states that there exists a time after which every crashed process is permanently suspected by all correct processes.
Fairness Constraints
We claim that Chandra-Toueg failure detectors encapsulate fairness guarantees of the underlying system. Such fairness is of two types: computational fairness and communicational fairness.
Computational Fairness. Here we define the notion of a proc-fair process. A process x is said to be k-proc-fair (where k is a non-negative integer) in a suffix γ of a run α, if, for all processes y ∈ Π, in every execution segment of γ in which y takes k + 1 steps, either (a) x takes at least one step, or (b) x is crashed.
We extend this notion of proc-fairness as follows:
• k-proc-distinguished: A process x is said to be k-proc-distinguished in run α if x is k-proc-fair in all suffixes of α
• Eventually k-proc-distinguished: A process x is said to be eventually k-proc-distinguished in α if, there exists some infinite suffix of α, where x is k-proc-fair.
Note that while other processes may be 'fair' with respect to a proc-distinguished process i, process i need not be fair with respect to other processes; i.e., a proc-distinguished process may take an unbounded number of steps in the duration between a non-proc-distinguished process' two consecutive steps. This is an important distinction between computational fairness and bounded relative process speeds defined in [17, 16] . Bounded relative process speeds may be viewed as a special case where every process is (eventually) k-proc-distinguished.
Communicational Fairness. Here we define the notion of a com-fair process. A process x is said to be d-com-fair (where d is a non-negative integer) in a suffix γ of a run α, if, for all processes y ∈ Π, for each message m sent from x to y in γ, during the execution segment starting from the configuration in which m is sent and ending with the configuration in which m is received, either (a) y takes no more than d steps, or (b) x is crashed 7 . Note that for a process x to be com-fair, the messages sent by x must be 'timely' with respect to the recipient, but only for as long as x is live. If a com-fair process x crashes, the messages sent by x that are in transit when x crashes can take an arbitrary amount of time to be delivered, or even be dropped.
Another point of interest is that in the traditional models of partial synchrony [17, 16] bounds on message delay are measured as the number of steps taken by the sender and the liveness of the sender is irrelevant to the bound on message delay. We model message delay (communicational fairness) differently for the two important reasons.
First, the traditional models of partial synchrony assume that relative process speeds are bounded. Consequently, if some live process takes a bounded number of steps while a message is in transit, then all processes take a bounded number of steps while a message is in transit. Hence, asserting the existence of a bound on the number of steps by the sender while a message is in transit is equivalent to asserting the existence of a bound on the number of steps by the recipient while the message is in transit. However, in our case, computational fairness is not a symmetric property. That is, a bound on the number of steps by the sender while a message is in transit need not translate to a bound on the number of steps by the receiver while the message is in transit. Consequently, measuring and bounding message delay is subtler under our proposed fairness framework.
Second, we denominate message delay (communicational fairness) as the number of steps taken by the recipient because the notion of a message being timely or late is relevant only to the recipient of the message and not the sender. Furthermore, we bound the number of steps taken by the recipient only while the sender is live because: while the sender is not crashed, it can successfully maintain an operational communication link with the recipient, and the link can ensure that messages are delivered before the recipient takes 'too many steps'. However, if the sender crashes, then the link is no longer guaranteed to stay operational, and hence, no guarantees can be provided on message delay and delivery.
We extend this notion of com-fairness as follows:
• Eventually d-com-distinguished: A process x is said to be eventually d-com-distinguished in run α if there exists some infinite suffix of α, where x is d-com-fair.
Fairness-Based Partially-Synchronous System Models
In this subsection we present four fairness-based partially-synchronous systems models that represent the fairness encapsulated by the four Chandra-Toueg failure detectors specified in Section 3.2.
1. All Fair (AF) is an asynchronous system with the following restriction on fairness: in every run, all processes are both k-proc-distinguished and d-com-distinguished, for known k and d.
2. Some Fair (SF) model is an asynchronous system with the following restriction on fairness: in each run, some correct process x is both k-proc-distinguished and d-com-distinguished, for known k and d.
3. Eventually All Fair (3AF) is an asynchronous system with the following restriction on fairness: for each run, there exists some (potentially unknown) time after which all processes are both k-proc-distinguished and d-com-distinguished, for known k and d. That is, eventually the system behaves like AF. This system model is analogous to the eventually synchronous system M 2 from [16] .
4. Eventually Some Fair (3SF) is an asynchronous system with the following restriction on fairness: for each run, there exists a (potentially unknown) time after which some correct process x is both k-proc-distinguished and d-comdistinguished, for known k and d. That is, eventually the system behaves like SF. Unsurprisingly, this system model is analogous to the system model S − [4] in which some correct process has eventually timely outbound links 8 .
Methodology
We claim that the Chandra-Toueg oracles encapsulate fairness (and not real-time) properties of the underlying system. We will show that the amount of fairness encapsulated by these oracles is specified by the aforedescribed fairness-based system models. In a precise sense, AF, SF, 3AF, and 3SF specify the exact amount of fairness encapsulated by P, S, 3P, and 3S, respectively. Alternatively, it can be said that AF, SF, 3AF, and 3SF are the 'weakest' system models to implement P, S, 3P, and 3S, respectively.
The methodology used to establish the above equivalence is as follows. First, we present a construction (described in Section 5) that uses a Chandra-Toueg oracle in an otherwise asynchronous system to schedule distributed applications such that each process executes its application steps 'fairly' with respect to other processes (and messages). The fairness properties guaranteed by the scheduler depend on the available failure detector. By employing P, S, 3P, or 3S, the scheduler provides fairness guarantees specified by AF, SF, 3AF, or 3SF, respectively. This shows that the failure detectors encapsulate at least as much fairness as is specified in the corresponding fairness-based system models. Next, we present an algorithm (described in Section 6) which implements a Chandra-Toueg oracle on top of these fairness-based systems. When this algorithm is deployed in AF, SF, 3AF, or 3SF, it implements P, S, 3P, or 3S, respectively. Thus, we show that these failure detectors encapsulate no more guarantees on fairness than what is provided by the corresponding fairness-based systems.
Extracting Fairness from Chandra-Toueg Failure Detectors
In this section, we present a distributed scheduler that 'extracts' the fairness encapsulated by the Chandra-Toueg failure detectors. The algorithm presented is a universal construction for the Chandra-Toueg hierarchy in the sense that depending on the failure detector used by the algorithm, the appropriate fairness guarantees are provided by the distributed scheduler. For simplicity, we assume that the application at each process always has some enabled step that it can take. Therefore, the local scheduler module is always in one of two states: waiting and active. When the scheduler module is waiting, the associated application module is not enabled to take steps. Upon becoming active, the scheduler module enables the associated application module to execute a single step and then the scheduler goes back to waiting. Additionally, the distributed scheduler 'intercepts' and forwards all the communication among the application modules.
The properties that must be satisfied by the distributed scheduler are the following:
• Local Progress. Every correct process must be scheduled to execute its application steps infinitely often, regardless of process crashes in the system.
• Fairness. If the distributed scheduler uses:
-P, then all the processes in the system are k-proc-distinguished and d-com-distinguished with respect to application actions. That is, the distributed scheduler implements the All Fair (AF) system model.
-S, then some correct process is k-proc-distinguished and d-com-distinguished. That is, the distributed scheduler implements the Some Fair (SF) system model.
-3P, then all the processes in the system are eventually k-proc-distinguished and eventually d-com-distinguished with respect to application actions. That is, the distributed scheduler implements the Eventual All Fair (3AF) system model.
-3S, then some correct process is eventually k-proc-distinguished and eventually d-com-distinguished. That is, the distributed scheduler implements the Eventual Some Fair (3SF) system model.
Interface Between Scheduler and Application
The scheduler provides three interfaces for an application module to interact with the local scheduler module and the application modules at other processes: executeAP P (), receiveAP P (), and sendAP P (). These interfaces are specified in Alg. 2 and described below.
The scheduler enables the application to take a step by invoking executeAP P () and in response, the application takes a single atomic step. If multiple actions of the application are enabled to be executed, then the scheduler is assumed to make a non-deterministic choice among the enabled actions subject to the constraint of weak fairness (which states that a continuously enabled action is eventually executed).
The scheduler at each process i takes all the messages destined for the application module at i and stores them locally in a receive buffer. While taking a step, the application takes receipt of messages by invoking receiveAP P (). In response to the invocation, the scheduler returns the contents of the local receive buffer to the application. Thus, the application can receive messages sent by other processes.
The application sends messages by invoking the sendAP P () interface. While taking a step, if the application at process i invokes sendAP P (), the scheduler at i takes receipt of all the messages that the application wants to send to all other processes in the system and stores these message in a local send buffer. The scheduler at i then sends the messages to the scheduler modules at the destination processes' receive buffer.
Algorithm Description
The algorithm in Alg. 1 and 2 implements a distributed scheduler with dynamic priorities and permits. Alg. 1 shows the actions of the scheduler and Alg. 2 shows the interface between the scheduler and the scheduled application. The idea of dynamic priorities and permits (also called forks) is borrowed from the algorithms to solve the dining philosophers problem in [10] and [28] . All the processes are assigned a static id and all the ids are known to all the processes in the system.
In Alg. 1 each process i has the following variables: s i .state which determines if the process is waiting or active. The height of a process is stored in the variable s i .ht which is initially 0. For each process j in the system, i maintains the variables: (a) s i .permit j to determine if the permit shared with j is currently held by i, (b) s i .req j to determine if the request token to request a permit from j is currently at i, and (c) s i .ht j which stores the last received value of j's height (in permits and request messages).
All processes start in the waiting state with the permits at higher-id processes and request tokens at lower-id processes. For a waiting process to become active, it must collect all its shared permits. A waiting process requests missing permits in Action 1. Upon receiving such a request in Action 2, the process determines if the request should be honored based on the following condition: if the process is waiting, holds the shared permit, and the requesting process has greater height (or equal height and higher process-id), then the process relinquishes the permit. Otherwise the process simply holds the token and defers sending the permit if the permit is present.
Upon receiving a permit in Action 3, the process again determines if the permit should be kept/deferred or sent based on the same condition mentioned previously.
Once a waiting process receives all shared permits from processes not suspected by the failure detector D, the process becomes active in Action 4. Upon becoming active, the process sends an application-message request (denoted reqM sg ) to all processes in the system in Action 4. Upon receiving such a message in Action 5, the process sends the contents of its local send buffer in response. The process receives the response to its reqM sg message in Action 6 in which the process takes all the received messages and adds them its local receive buffer and that enables Action 7. In Action 7, the process invokes executeAP P () to execute an application step before exiting. When the process executes an application step, the application invokes receiveAP P () described in Alg. 2 to receive all the messages in the local receive buffer, and the application action sends messages by invoking sendAP P () described in Alg. 2 which simply adds the message to the local send buffer.
Eventually, the process exits its active state by reducing it height below all processes (whose shared permits it holds), sends all the permits away and transits to waiting in Action 7.
Proof of correctness
In this section we prove that the distributed scheduler in Alg. 1 satisfies the local progress and fairness properties specified in Section 5. For the purpose of the proof, consider an arbitrary run α of Alg. 1.
Lost request tokens or permits can compromise progress, while duplicated request tokens or permits can compromise fairness. First we prove that every pair of processes share a unique permit and a unique request token. We use the following notation to denote that a message of type y is in transit from process i to j: M y i→j . Lemma 1. For all configurations in α, there exists exactly one request token between each pair of live processes; that is, for all pairs of processes (i, j):
Proof. For each pair of processes, the initialization code creates a unique request token at the lower-priority process. Since communication channels are reliable, this token is neither lost nor duplicated while in transit. Only Actions 1 and 2 can enum {waiting, active} : si.state ← waiting State variable is initially set to waiting integer si.ht ← 0 ∀j ∈ Π − {i} : boolean si.permit j ← (i.id > j.id) Process i holds the shared permit if it has higher id boolean si.req j ← (i.id < j.id)
Process i holds the shared request token if it has lower id integer si.htj ← 0
The height of process j integer si.seq j ← 0
Generates a new sequence number to solicit messages from j integer si.maxAckj ← 0
Records the highest sequence number among the messages received from j set si.send bufferj
The send buffer through which the application at i sends messages to j set si.receive bufferj
The receive buffer from which the application at i receives messages from j 1 : {si.state = waiting} −→ Action 1 2 :
∀j ∈ Π − {i} where si.req j ∧ ¬si.permit j do Request permit 3 :
send request, si.ht to sj; si.req j ← f alse 4 : {upon receive request, ht from sj} −→ Action 2 5 :
si.req j ← true 6 :
si.htj ← ht 7 :
send permit, si.ht to sj; si.permit j ← f alse Send permit if si is waiting and sj has higher priority 9 : {upon receive permit, ht from sj} −→ Action 3 10 : si.permit ← true 11 : si.htj ← ht 12 : if (si.req j ∧ (si.state = waiting) ∧ ((ht < si.ht) ∨ ((ht = si.ht) ∧ (i < j))) 13 :
send permit, si.ht to sj; si.permit j ← f alse Send permit if si is waiting and sj has higher priority 14 : {(si.state = waiting) ∧ (∀j / ∈ D :: si.permit j )} −→ Action 4 (Note that the failure detector D is queried) 15 : si.state ← active Become active upon holding permits from trusted processes and ignore suspected processes 16 : foreach j in Π − {i} 17 : increment si.seq j by 1 Generate a new sequence number to tag a request message 18 :
send reqM sg, si.seq j to sj Upon becoming active, send a request message to all processes 19 : {upon receive reqM sg, num from sj} −→ Action 5 20 :
msgSet ← si.receive bufferj; 21 :
si.receive bufferj ← ∅ 22 :
send msgSet, num to sj Upon receiving a message request, send the contents of the local send buffer 23 : {(upon receive msgSet , num from sj)} −→ Action 6 24 :
si.receive bufferj ← si.receive bufferj ∪ msgSet Add received messages to local receive buffer 25 :
si.maxAckj ← max(num, si.maxAckj) Verify if this is in response to the latest request message 26 : {(si.state = active) ∧ (∀j ∈ Π − {i} :: ((si.maxAckj = si.seq j ) ∨ (j ∈ D)))} −→ Action 7 (Note that the failure detector D is queried) 27 : executeAP P () Execute an application step. The procedure executeAP P () is specified in Alg. 2 28 : si.ht ← min(∀j ∈ Π − {i} :: si.htj, si.ht) − 1
Reduce height below all neighbors whose height is known 29 : ∀j ∈ Π − {i} where (si.permit j ) do 30 :
send permit, si.ht to sj; si.permit j ← f alse Send all held permits 31 : si.state ← waiting Exit the active state and start waiting after executing an application action Alg. 1. Actions for scheduler at process i.
procedure executeAP P () execute an enabled application action in which application action invokes receiveAP P () to receive messages application action invokes sendAP P (m, j) to send message m to process j procedure receiveAP P () returnV alue ← ∪ ∀j∈Π−{i} {(si.receive bufferj, j)} ∀j ∈ Π − {i} do si.receive bufferj ← ∅ return returnV alue procedure sendAP P (m, j) si.send bufferj ← si.send bufferj ∪ {m}
Alg. 2. Interaction between the scheduler and the application.
modify the token variables. No token is lost, because every token received is locally stored (Action 2), and no token is locally removed unless it is sent (Action 1). No token is duplicated, because every token sent is locally removed, and no absent token is ever sent (Action 1). Thus, token uniqueness is preserved.
Lemma 2. For all configurations in α, there exists exactly one permit between each pair of live processes; that is, for all pairs of processes (i, j):
Proof. For each pair of processes, the initialization code creates a unique permit at the higher-priority process. Since communication channels are reliable, this permit is neither lost nor duplicated while in transit. Only Actions 2, 3, and 5 modify the permit variables. No permit is lost, because every permit received is locally stored (Action 3), and no permit is locally removed unless it is sent (Actions 2, 3, & 7) . No permit is duplicated, because every permit sent is locally removed, and no absent permit is ever sent (Actions 2, 3, & 7) . Thus, permit uniqueness is preserved.
In order to prove local progress, we are required to show that every correct process is guaranteed to take application steps infinitely many times. This proof is established in two steps. Note that a process can execute its application action only when it is active. So, in the first step (Lemma 4), we show that a correct process is active only for a finite duration. In the second step (Lemma 5 and Theorem 1), given that a correct process is active only for a finite time, we establish that every waiting process eventually becomes active. Since a correct process starts waiting upon exiting, it follows that a correct process becomes active infinitely many times, and therefore takes application steps infinitely many times.
Lemma 3. For all configurations in α, for all pairs of processes (i, j) where i = j, s i .maxAck j never exceeds s i .seq j ; that is, ∀i, j ∈ Π : i = j : s i .maxAck j ≤ s i .seq j .
Proof. Initially, s i .seq j = s i .maxAck j = 0, therefore the lemma is true initially. Note that the only action that changes the value of s i .seq j is Action 6, and Action 6 increments the value by 1. Therefore, if the lemma was true before i executed Action 6, then the lemma is true upon executing Action 6 as well.
The only action that changes the value of s i .maxAck j is Action 6. If Action 6 increases the value of s i .maxAck j , then the increased value num is received by i in a message msgSet , num from j. But note that j sends msgSet , num to i only upon receiving reqM sg, num from i (Action 5). But in the message reqM sg, num sent by i to j (at time t ), the value of num (in line 25, Action 6, Alg. 1) is s i .seq j at time t . Inspection of the algorithm reveals that s i .seq j is non-decreasing. Therefore, the new s i .maxAck j is either the current or a previous value of s i .seq j . Therefore, if the lemma was true before i executed Action 6, then the lemma is true upon executing Action 6 as well.
Thus, the lemma is true initially, and the lemma is true after executing any action that changes the values of s i .seq j and s i .MaxAck j ; thus proved. Now we are ready to show that all correct processes are active only for finite durations.
Lemma 4. Let C be a configuration in α at time t in which a process i is active. Then in some configuration C at time t > t, either i is crashed or i is waiting.
Proof. Let process i become active in configuration C at time t (in Action 4) and remain active through time t ≥ t in configuration C. If i is faulty, then i crashes at some time t > t, thus satisfying the lemma.
However, if i is correct, then the following argument holds: From Action 4, we know that i sends the message reqM sg, s i .seq j to all other processes in the step that i takes immediately following C . For all correct processes j, j receives the message reqM sg, s i .seq j from i, executes Action 5, and sends msgSet, num where num = s i .seq j . The message msgSet, num is eventually received by i (i is still live) in Action 6 where i sets the value of s i .maxAck j to num (which equals s i .seq j ). This follows from Lemma 3 which shows that s i .maxAck j ≤ s i .seq j , and num = s i .seq j ; therefore, in line 25 of Action 6, s i .maxAck j is updated to num = s i .seq j .
For all faulty processes j, either i eventually receives msgSet, num from j where num = s i .seq j , and hence, eventually s i .maxAck j = s i .seq j , or j crashes and by strong completeness, j is eventually and permanently suspected by the failure detector D.
Therefore, eventually for all processes j ∈ Π − {i}, either s i .maxAck j = s i .seq j or j is suspected by D. That is, eventually, Action 7 is enabled at i and i starts waiting. Thus shown that if a process i is active in configuration C at time t, then at some future configuration C at time t > t either i is crashed or i is waiting.
Given that live processes are active only for finite durations, in order to prove progress, we need to show that every waiting process eventually becomes active. For this purpose, we introduce some definitions to construct a metric function on configurations of α. First, we measure the priority distance between any two processes i and j in a configuration as:
Suppose for any pair of processes i and j that dist(i, j) = d in some configuration where j is waiting. While j remains waiting, s j .ht remains unchanged. Also, recall from Action 7 that each process reduces its height (below all the processes whose shared permits it holds) when exiting the active state. Consequently, d is an upper bound on the maximum number of times that process i can overtake process j and become active before either j becomes active or s i .ht < s j .ht. Now we define a metric function M : Π → IN for each process j ∈ Π as follows:
Note that M is bounded below by 0, and that M (j) = 0 iff j currently has the highest priority value among all processes in Π. In general, the value of M (j) depends only on processes that are currently higher-priority than j. This is because dist(i, j) = 0 for any process i with lower height than i or equal height as j but lower process id. If M (j) = b, then b is an upper bound on how many times any higher-priority process can become active before either j becomes active or j is the process with highest priority.
Also note that the metric value of each process in a given configuration is unique:
. These properties follow from the fact that priorities are totally ordered.
Finally,the metric value M (j) never increases while process j is waiting. M (j) can only increase by reducing the height s j .ht in Action 7 while exiting the active state. Importantly, this change in relative priority actually causes the metric values of all other processes to decrease.
We are now prepared to state and prove the following helper lemma for progress:
Lemma 5. Let C be any configuration in α with at least one live waiting process. Let j be the live waiting process in C with minimal metric. Then there is a later configuration C in α such that: (1) j is active in C , or (2) j is crashed in C , or (3) some other process i is live and waiting and M (i) < M (j) in C .
Proof. Assume in contradiction that in every configuration after C, j is live and waiting and has the minimal metric. We will show that eventually j is active, a contradiction.
Let C be a configuration after C in α in where all faulty processes have crashed and by strong completeness of D, all such crashed processes are permanently suspected. After C , j only needs to collect permits from correct processes. We show that j succeeds in collecting and keeping all these permits, and thus, j will become active.
Let i be any correct process other than j. First we show that j will not lose the permit it holds with i. By hypothesis, j is waiting and has higher priority than any correct process from configuration C onwards (recall that M (j) never increases while j is waiting; hence, j will continue to be the highest priority process until it becomes active), so any request token received by j in Action 2 will be deferred. Note that it is possible for j to receive an 'old' request token from i which has higher priority value, thereby causing j to give up its shared permit. However, j will send the request token to i in Action 1 right after sending the permit, and this time i will have to return the permit to j because j has higher priority. Thereafter, eventually, j defers the request token from i until j becomes active.
Now we show that j will eventually acquire the permit shared with i. By Lemma 2, j shares a unique request token with i. All permits that were in transit to j when j started waiting are delivered in finite time. For any missing permits, if j holds the request token, then j will eventually send the corresponding token.
However, if j has neither the request token or the shared permit upon transiting to waiting, then eventually the shared permit and the request token are either at i or at j. We now show that eventually j receives either the request token or the shared permit. For the purposes of contradiction, suppose eventually i holds both the permit and the request token permanently. If i is active, then i eventually starts waiting (by Lemma 4) and sends the permit to j in Action 5. If i is waiting, then depending on the order in which the request token and the permit arrived at i, process i executes either Action 2 or Action 3. Since priorities are non-increasing, the priority encoded in the token and the permit received by i must be at least as high as j's current priority. We have already established that j has the highest priority in the system. Therefore, in both Action 2 and Action 3, i sends the shared permit to j.
If j (eventually) receives the request token, then j sends this request token to i in Action 1. Recall that by hypothesis, j has higher priority than i; consequently, this permit request must be honored unless i is currently active. In the latter case, we know from Lemma 4 that i eventually exits to be waiting; therefore, the requested permit will be sent when i starts waiting in Action 5.
Thus, we conclude that if j remains waiting indefinitely, then j eventually suspects each faulty process and eventually holds the shared permit with each correct process. By Line 14, the guard on Action 4 is enabled. So j becomes active. Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 satisfies local progress. That is, every correct process takes infinitely many application steps.
Proof. Note that to prove the theorem, it is sufficient to prove the following claim: For every k, every configuration C of α, and every correct process j, if M (j) = k in C, then there is a later configuration in which j is active. We prove this by a complete (strong) induction on metric values.
Base Case: k = 0. Suppose M (j) = 0 in configuration C. Since 0 is the smallest possible value that the metric can have and j is correct, Lemma 5 implies that in some subsequent configuration C , either j is active or there is another live waiting process i whose metric is smaller than j's metric in C .
However, since a j's metric can never increase while j is waiting, and it is not possible for a process to have a metric less than 0, no such live waiting process i exists. So, j eventually becomes active.
Inductive Case: k > 0. Suppose for every k < k, every configuration C of α, and every correct process j, if M (j) = k in C, then there is a later configuration in which j is active. We must show that for every configuration C and every correct process j, if M (j) = k in C, then there is a later configuration in which j is active.
Let C be a configuration, and let j be a correct waiting process in C with M (j) = k. Suppose that k is the minimal metric value among all correct waiting processes in C. Then Lemma 5 applies to j, so we conclude that j eventually becomes active, or some correct process i with M (i) < M (j) starts waiting. Alternatively, suppose that k is not the minimal metric value among all correct waiting processes in C. Then some correct waiting process i with M (i) < k already exists. Either way, we conclude that j eventually becomes active or the inductive hypothesis applies to some correct waiting process i with M (i) < k. In the latter case, process i becomes active. By Lemma 4, i eventually exits the active state by executing Action 5, which thereby lowers the height s i .ht and decreases dist(i, j) by at least 1. Recall that while j remains waiting, M (j) does not increase. Thus, any decrease in dist(i, j) will cause the metric value of M (j) to become less than k. Since j is now a correct waiting process with M (j) < k, the inductive hypothesis applies directly to j. Thus, we conclude that j eventually becomes active.
By Lemma 4 and Action 7, we know that every time j becomes active, it executes an application action, and j eventually exits. Upon exiting j starts waiting again. Thus, we show that Algorithm 1 satisfies local progress by complete induction.
To establish the proof for computational fairness, we make use of the notion of distinguished processes. Recall that a distinguished process is never suspected until it crashes and is suspected forever thereafter.
Theorem 2. Every (eventually) distinguished process is (eventually) 2-proc-distinguished. 9 If all processes are distinguished, then a careful analysis shows that all correct distinguished processes are, in fact, 1-proc-distinguished. We omit this here because, for the purposes of our results, it is sufficient to show that a correct distinguished process is 2-proc-distinguished.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary run α and let i be any process that is eventually distinguished in α starting at some time t i . We must show that for all j, in every interval starting after t i in which j takes 3 application steps, either i takes at least 1 application step or i is crashed.
Consider a process j = i that takes 3 steps after t i , say at times t, t , and t and suppose that i is live through t . We must show that i takes a step at least once between t and t . Since i is distinguished after t i , the failure detector D at j never suspects i between t i and t .
At time t, let the height of i be ht i and the height of j be ht j . Let ht j > ht i . From Action 7, we know that j sends the permit to i with height ht j encoded in the permit message. We also know that j takes an application step at time t and therefore is active at time t . Therefore, j must hold the permit it shares with i at time t . That is, i sends the permit to j in the interval (t, t ). Note that i sends the permit to j only in actions 2 and 7. If i executes Action 7 in (t, t ), it implies that i was active in the interval (t, t ), and hence took an application step in that interval; thus, the lemma is satisfied.
On the other hand, if i sends the permit to j in Action 2 (and noting that i is not active in the interval (t, t )), then i encodes its height ht i in the permit. Therefore, when j is active at time t , the value of s j .ht i is ht i . When j transits to waiting, it reduces its height to ht j < ht i and encodes this height in the permit sent to i.
We know that j takes an application step again at time t , and so j is active again at time t . Therefore, j must hold the permit it shares with i at time t . That is, i sends the permit to j in the interval (t , t ). Note that in this interval i does not send the permit to j in Action 2. We conclude this based on the heights of i and j. When j sends a request token to i in (t , t ), it is encoded with height ht j < ht i . Therefore, when i executes Action 2 upon receiving this request token, i notes that j's height is lower than its own height, and so does not send the permit to j. Therefore, j could have received the permit from i only through Action 7 (executed by i); that is, i must have been active at some time in the interval (t , t ), and hence, i must have taken an application step in the interval (t , t ). That is, from time t i onwards, i is 2-proc-distinguished.
In other words, i is eventually 2-proc-distinguished. However, if t i = 0, then i is 2-proc-distinguished in the run α; that is, if i is distinguished process, then i is 2-proc-distinguished.
Thus shown that every (eventually) distinguished process is (eventually) 2-proc-distinguished.
Theorem 3. Every (eventually) distinguished process is (eventually) 1-com-distinguished
Proof. Consider an arbitrary run α and let i be any process that is eventually distinguished in α starting at some time t i . We show that for all j and all application messages m sent from i and received by j after t i , during the time m is in transit, either j takes at most one step or i is crashed. Consider a process j = i to which i sends an application message m at some time t after t i . This message is sent by the application when i is active and invokes sendAP P (m, j), which causes m to be added to s i .send buffer j (the message is actually sent by the scheduler later during the execution). By the assumption that m is received by j, we know that j takes at least one application step after t. Again, note that j executes its application step only when j is active. Let the earliest time after t that j is active be t . In the active session that starts at time t , j sends reqM sg, s j .seq i to i in Action 4.
From Lemma 3 we know that s j .maxAck i ≤ s j .seq i before j executes Action 4. But Action 4 increments s j .seq i , therefore, after j executes Action 4, s j .maxAck i < s j .seq i From Lemma 4, we know that j eventually stops being active. Since i is a correct eventually distinguished process, we also know that j does not suspect i. Therefore, if j eventually exits the active state by executing Action 7, then eventually s j .maxAck i = s j .seq i .
The above two arguments imply that while j is , active, the value of s j .maxAck i is updated to s j .seq i . However, the only action that updates s j .maxAck i is Action 6, and Action 6 is executes only upon receiving msgSet , num .
While the message reqM sg, s j .seq i sent by j in action 4 is eventually received by i in Action 5 (or i is crashed, in which case the lemma is satisfied). Action 5 empties s i .send buffer j and sends the messages in the buffer to j. But note that the message m was in s i .send buffer j before Action 5 is executed. Therefore, message m is sent to j in the message msgSet , s j .seq i . This message is eventually received by j in Action 6, and Action 6 puts message m into the receive buffer s j .receive buffer i and updates s j .maxAck i to s i .seq j .
Therefore, when j executes Action 7, m is already in s j .receive buffer i . Note that in Action 7, j executes an application action which will receive all the messages in s j .receive buffer i (from receiveAP P () in Alg. 2). That is, j takes no more than 1 step after m is sent and before m is received. Therefore, j is 1-com-fair with respect to i for all processes j from time t i .
In other words, i is eventually 1-com-distinguished. However, if t i = 0, then i is 2-com-distinguished in the run α; that is, if i is distinguished process, then i is 1-proc-distinguished.
That is, i is 1-com-distinguished.
Extracting Chandra-Toueg Failure Detectors From Fairness-Based Systems
In this section we show that the system models AF, SF, 3AF, and 3SF are sufficient to implement the failure detectors P, S, 3P, and 3S, respectively. This result combined with the result in Section 5 shows that AF, SF, 3AF, and 3SF have the minimal synchronism necessary to implement P, S, 3P, and 3S, respectively.
The algorithm in Alg. 3 implements a failure detector under fairness-based system models described in Section 3.4. The failure detector implemented by Alg. 3 is determined by the fairness guarantees of the underlying system. Specifically, the algorithm implements P, S, 3P, or 3S, if the underlying system model is AF, SF, 3AF, or 3SF, respectively.
Algorithm Description
In Alg. 3, the failure detector module at process i maintains a timer timerValue j for each process j in the system which counts down from k+d to 0, where, in the various system models described in Section 3.4, the bounds on fairness are specified by the existence of k-proc-distinguished and d-com-distinguished processes. The timer timerValue j is decremented by 1 in each step (line 10). In each step process i receives zero or more messages from all other processes (line 2) and sends a heartbeat to each process j in the system (line 4). If i receives a heartbeat from j, then i deletes j from the set suspectList (line 6) and resets the timer to k + d (line 7). If timerValue j is decremented to 0, then i adds j to suspectList (line 9). Here we assume that when the failure detector module is queried, it returns suspectList. Hence, when i adds j to suspectList, i is said to suspect j as having crashed; when deletes j from suspectList, i is said to trust j.
Proof of Correctness
We now show that the action system in Alg. 3 satisfies strong completeness and different accuracy properties depending on the underlying system model. For the purpose of the proofs, we consider an arbitrary run α of Alg. 3.
Theorem 4. The action system in Alg. 3 satisfies strong completeness; that is, there exists a time after which every crashed process is permanently suspected.
integer timerValue j ← timeOut 1 : {true} −→ Proof. In α, processes send heartbeats in every step. If a process i crashes at time t in α, i stops taking steps after t, and so stops sending heartbeats. Eventually, all the (finite) heartbeats sent by i are delivered. Let the last such delivery be at time t ≥ t. Inspection of the code reveals that the maximum value of timerValue i at j at time t is k + d. Thereafter, in every step executed by a process j after time t , timerValue i is decremented (if timerValue i is not already 0) until j receives another heartbeat from i. Process j resets timerValue i to k + d only upon receiving a heartbeat from i. Since we have established that no such heartbeat are received by j after t , it follows that in at most k + d + 1 steps, timerValue i is decremented to 0 at all processes j, and so j starts suspecting i (in line 9). Since j does not receive any more heartbeats from i, j suspects i permanently.
We prove accuracy properties in two steps. In the first step (Lemma 6), we show that a correct process is trusted infinitely often; that is, if a correct process j trusts a correct process i at time t, then there exists a time t > t such that j trusts i at time t . Note that this permits j to (falsely) suspect i in the open interval (t, t ). In the second step (Lemma 7), we show that if a process i is trusted after it is k-proc-distinguished and d-com-distinguished, then i will be continuously trusted until i crashes. Lemmas 6 and 7 are used to prove the various accuracy properties satisfied by Alg. 3, depending on the underlying system model. Lemma 6. In a run α of Alg. 3, if process i is correct, then every correct process trusts i infinitely often; that is, ∀t ∈ IN, there exists a time t > t such that j trusts i at time t Proof. Consider a run α Alg. 3 where a process i is correct. From lines 5-6 of Alg. 3 we know that a correct process (say) j = i trusts process i upon receiving a message from i. We also know that i sends heartbeats to all processes in every step (Alg. 3). Hence, if i is correct, then i takes steps infinitely often, and sends heartbeats infinitely often. Reliable communication guarantees that no heartbeat is lost. Therefore, all correct processes receive heartbeats from i infinitely often, and hence, execute lines 5-6 of Alg. 3 infinitely often. Therefore, all correct processes trust i infinitely often.
Lemma 7. In a run α of Alg. 3, if i becomes k-proc-distinguished and d-com-distinguished from time t, and the value of timerValue i is k + d at a process (say) j at time t ≥ t, then from time t onwards, i is never suspected by j until i crashes.
Proof. Consider a run α of Alg. 3. Let i become k-proc-distinguished and d-com-distinguished in α from time t. Let the value of timerValue i be k + d at a process (say) j at time t ≥ t. We know that the value of timerValue i is decremented by 1 in each step until j receives a message from i. We now show that j is guaranteed to receive a message from i before timerValue i is decremented to 0.
Note that i sends a heartbeat to j in each action that i executes. Given that i is k-proc-distinguished and d-comdistinguished, we know that i will send at least one heartbeat to j before j has taken k + 1 steps after t , and this heartbeat is received by j before j has taken k + d + 1 steps after t . Recall that time t , the value of timerValue i is k + d and is decremented by 1 at every step taken by j. However, j receives at least one heartbeat from i within k + d steps, and so the value of timerValue i is reset to k + d (in line 7) before it reaches 0.
Note that for j to start suspecting i, timerValue i must be 0, and we have shown that if j starts trusting i, then the value of timerValue i is reset to k + d (in line 7) before it reaches 0. Therefore, from time t onwards, i is never suspected by j until i crashes.
Theorem 5. If the action system in Alg. 3 is executed on a AF system model, Alg. 3 implements the eventaully perfect failure detector 3P.
Proof. Recall that the AF system model guarantees that every process is k-proc-distinguished and d-com-distinguished from time t = 0. Also at time t = 0, at each process j, the value of timerValue i = k + d for every other processes i in the system. Applying lemma 7 with t = t = 0, we know that i is never suspected by j until i crashes. Since i and j are arbitrary processes in the system. It follows that no process is suspected before it crashes. This, in conjunction with theorem 4 shows that every process is distinguished; that is, Alg. 3 implements the perfect failure detector P.
Theorem 6. If the action system in Alg. 3 is executed on a 3AF system model, Alg. 3 implements the eventually perfect failure detector P.
Proof. Consider a pair of correct processes i and j. Recall that the 3AF system model guarantees that i process is k-procdistinguished and d-com-distinguished from some (unknown) time t. From Lemma 6 we know that j trusts i infinitely often, which implies that value of timervalue j at i is k + d infinitely often. Applying lemma 7 we know that eventually j never suspects i. On the other hand, if i is faulty and crashes in finite time, then from theorem 4 we know that eventually j always suspects i. In other words, i is eventually distinguished. Since i is an arbitrary process in the system, it follows that all the processes are eventually distinguished. That is, Alg. 3 implements the eventually perfect failure detector 3P.
Theorem 7.
If the action system in Alg. 3 is executed on a SF system model, Alg. 3 implements the strong failure detector S.
Proof. Recall that the SF system model guarantees that some correct process i is k-proc-distinguished and d-com-distinguished from time t = 0. Also at time t = 0, at each process j, the value of timerValue i = k + d. Applying lemma 7 with t = t = 0, we know that i is never suspected by j. This, in conjunction with theorem 4 shows that some correct process is distinguished and all faulty processes are eventually distinguished; that is, Alg. 3 implements the strong failure detector S. Theorem 8. If the action system in Alg. 3 is executed on a 3SF system model, Alg. 3 implements the eventually strong failure detector 3S.
Proof. Recall that the 3SF system model guarantees that eventually some correct process i is k-proc-distinguished and d-com-distinguished. Let j be a correct process. From Lemma 6 we know that j trusts i infinitely often, which implies that value of timervalue j at i is k + d infinitely often. Applying lemma 7 we know that eventually j never suspects i. This, in conjunction with theorem 4 shows that some correct process is distinguished and all faulty processes are eventually distinguished; that is, Alg. 3 implements the strong failure detector S.
Discussion
Complete Synchrony and P. AF, the weakest system model to implement P, seems very similar to the synchronous system except that message delay is denominated in real time in the latter and in recipient's steps in the former. However, there is a significant difference between the two system models. In a synchronous system with bound ∆ on message delay, if a process i sends a message m to j and i crashes before m is delivered to j, then m is still guaranteed to be delivered to j in ∆ time units. However, in AF, if i crashes when m (sent by i) is still in transit to j, then m may be arbitrarily delayed or m may even by dropped. In some sense, this difference in the behavior between AF and synchronous systems is the 'gap in synchronism' between the perfect failure detector P and synchronous systems. This is consistent with the result in [11] that shows that the synchronous system has a greater degree of synchronism than P.
On Solving Consensus. It is well known that 3S is the weakest failure detector to solve consensus, and we have specified 3SF as the weakest system model to implement 3S. Does that mean 3AF is the weakest system model to solve consensus? The answer is no. Recall that 3S is the weakest to solve consensus only in majority-correct environments. But, 3AF is the weakest to implement 3S in all environments. So this suggests that there is a weaker system model which can implement 3S in majority-correct environments, but not in all environments. Our conjecture is that a fairness-based variant of the system model in [23] is the weakest system model to solve consensus in majority-correct environments.
Future Work. Several avenues of future work remain. There are other failure detectors that extend the Chandra-Toueg hierarchy (e.g., the trusting failure detector T [15] ). The weakest system models to implement all the failure detectors in the extended Chandra-Toueg hierarchy remains to be specified. The precise characterization of the set of failure detector classes that encapsulate fairness remains an open question.
